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EVIDENCE-Presumption That Trial Judge Disregarded
Incompetent Evidence In Reaching His Verdict Does Not
Obtain Where An Objection to the Evidence Has Been
Overruled.
Having waived his right to trial by jury, the defendant was tried in
the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illi-
nois, on one count each of rape and aggravated kidnapping.'
The prosecuting witness testified that on December 20, 1968, at ap-
proximately 3:00 A.M., defendant entered a laundromat in the City
of Elgin, Kane County, in which prosecutrix was doing her laundry,
and forced her to go with him at knifepoint. He proceeded to drive to a
nearby bar, which was just closing, and then to a cemetery in Cook
County, holding the knife in his hand at all times. Upon reaching the
cemetery, the defendant put the knife in his pocket, where it remained.
After approximately one half hour of talking and petting, defendant
said, "You know what we're here for," and prosecutrix shrugged and
said "Well, let's do it." Prosecutrix testified that she was too scared to
try to resist and that "during the whole course of the evening"
she was "trying to make it appear that she was attracted to him," so
that she might "live a little while longer."' 2  After prosecutrix had
helped defendant dress, he drove her back to her car, and prosecutrix
returned to the laundromat to pick up her clothes. Defendant then re-
turned to the laundromat and made a date to meet prosecutrix the next
week. She then drove home, took her clothes out of the car, walked
into her house, washed her hands and face, checked on her children,
and then went down the block to her aunt's home. Upon being
questioned by her aunt, prosecutrix complained that she had been raped.
They called the police, and prosecutrix again related her story.
Defendant, on the stand, admitted the act of intercourse, but denied
that a knife was produced and contended that prosecutrix went with
him willingly and that the act of intercourse was consensual.
The balance of the substantive testimony came from the aunt and the
police officer to whom prosecutrix had related her story. This testi-
1. Ill. Revised Statutes, ch. 38, sec. 10-2(a): "A kidnapper .. . is guilty of the
offense of aggravated kidnapping when he (3) inflicts great bodily harm or commits
another felony upon his victim.
2. Abstract at 28-30.
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mony, objected to as hearsay, was admitted as an excited utterance. It
was, in fact, a recital of what prosecutrix had told them, repeating in
substance almost every detail of the incident as alleged by the prosecu-
trix.
At the conclusion of the evidence, defendant was found guilty of ag-
gravated kidnapping, the rape charge was dismissed for lack of venue,
and defendant was sentenced to from one to five years in the Illinois
State Penitentiary.
On appeal, defendant contended that the court erred in allowing the
prosecutrix's aunt and the police officer to testify as to the details of her
complaint, such complaint being too far removed in time and oppor-
tunity from the act complained of to be an excited utterance. 3
The State argued that the testimonies were admissible either as ex-
cited utterances, or to show the fact of complaint and thus corroborate
prosecutrix's testimony.4  HELD: Reversed and remanded. 5
(1) The statements made by prosecutrix were too far removed in
time from the occurrence to be admissible as excited utterances;
(2) The testimony was too extensive and detailed for the purpose
of showing the fact of complaint; and
(3) The presumption that the trial judge in a bench trial consid-
ered only admissible evidence in reaching his decision does not apply
when incompetent evidence was admitted over objection.
The charge of rape has traditionally raised many problems. By its
very nature, rape is a crime which is likely to have few witnesses. It
is also a charge which is thought to carry a great risk of falsehood,
whether from delusion, spite, or shame after consensual intercourse. 6
Normally, even when a trial resolves itself into two witnesses, each tell-
ing conflicting stories under oath, the law leaves it to the trier of fact to
3. Brief of the defendant, at 11.
4. Brief of the plaintiff at 7-10.
5. People v. Stewart, - Ill. App. 2d -, 264 N.E.2d 557 (1970).
6. 3A WIGMORE, EVMENCE, sec. 924(a) (Chadbourn Rev. 1970); for a collection
of examples from medical literature, see Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 227-39,
143 N.E.2d 649, 656-62 (1957) (dissenting opinion); see also, Comment, Forcible and
Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent
Standard, 62 Yale L.J. 55, 68-70 (1952); But see Sheehy, Nice Girls Don't Get Into
Trouble, New York Magazine 4.7 (Feb. 15, 1971) page 26, where the author argues
that only one-third of rapes and rape attempts are reported because the "woman feels,
or is made to feel, like a criminal." An examination of the accuracy of this argument
is obviously beyond the scope of this comment. However, it is submitted that even if
this "public rape psychology" does diminish the number of true complaints, these
psychological pressures may have much less effect on the number of false accusations,
for the need which gave rise to the fabrication in the first place might tend to overcome
these pressures. But even granting the point, the cases contain a sufficient number of
false accusations to support the court's concern.
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distinguish truth from falsehood in deciding guilt or innocence, giving
due weight of the demeanor of the witnesses and the presumption of in-
nocence.
While the presumption of innocence in a rape case is an essential
safeguard, there exists a large danger that this protection will be ig-
nored. When the jury is presented with the opportunity to choose be-
tween the testimony of a woman who alleges she has been raped, and
denial of the alleged rapist, the result may be that outrage at the at-
tacker and sympathy for the victim will override the presumption of in-
nocence.
7
To compensate, in part, for this risk, the courts have generally re-
quire a greater degree of corroboration to support a charge of rape,8
and have more closely scrutinized the evidence upon which a conviction
for rape is based.9
A rape complaint has been held admissible, against an objection that
it is hearsay, as an excited utterance or a corroborative statement. Gen-
erally, the details of a complaint are hearsay and must come within an
exception to the rule to be admitted.
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a
statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an
assertion to show the truth of the matter asserted therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court as-
serter. 10
Since the purpose of introducing the details of a rape complaint is,
almost invariably, to prove the facts asserted in the complaint and thus
substantiate the declarant's testimony, these details of the complaint are
hearsay. In the past, Illinois courts have viewed the complaint, when
it occurs in close time proximity to the alleged attack, as part of the act
in question and have admitted the statements as "part of the res gestae".
It is apparent, however, that the evidentiary value of the statements do
not arise because the complaint is an essential part of the occurrence, or
because it explains an ambiguous transaction, but rather because it tends
to prove the fact of the occurrence itself. It is thus hearsay and must
7. See HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *636.
8. People v. Carruthers, 379 11. 388, - N.E.2d 388 (1942); People v. O'Con-
nor, 412 Il1. 304, 106 N.E.2d 176 (1952). In some cases, the legislatures have taken
the lead. See, e.g., New York Penal Law, sec. 2013 (McKinney 1944); for listing, see
7 WIGMORE sec. 2061 (3rd).
9. People v. Kazmierczyk, 357 11. 592, 192 N.E. 657 (1934); People v. Mays,
23 Ill. 2d 520, 179 N.E.2d 654 (1962).
10. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, sec. 225 (1954); compare with 6 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE, sec. 1746 (3rd 1940): "Whenever an utterance is used as testimony that
the fact asserted in it did in fact occur as asserted . . . it is being used testimonially
and is within the prohibition of the hearsay rule."
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fall within some exception to the rule to be admissible. The res gestae
exception has been repudiated by recent Illinois decisions and thus ad-
mission of the. details of the complaint must depend upon other qualifi-
cations.
Hearsay declarations are generally excluded, not because they are in-
herently unreliable, but rather because there is no way to test their relia-
bility at trial. Since the witness has no first-hand knowledge of the
event in question, he is able to testify only to the fact of declarant's as-
sertion, and not the truth of it. Thus, cross-examination, the "most
efficacious test which the law has devised for the discovery of truth,""
is limited to whether or not the assertion was actually made, while the
truth of the matter must rest on the credit of the absent declarant. 12
But since the hearsay rule was developed to protect against the ad-
mission of statements whose reliability was not subject to test at trial, it
was logical to except from its application statements whose reliability
was likely to be high.13 Thus, statements made in reaction to a star-
tling experience without sufficient time for fabrication are admitted in
the belief that they are likely to be reliable:
There are many situations in which it can be easily seen that such a
required test [cross-examination] would add little as a security, be-
cause its purpose had been already substantially accomplished. If a
statement has been made under such circumstances that even a
skeptical caution would look upon it as trustworthy (in the ordinary
instance) in a high degree of probability, it would be pedantic to in-
sist on a test whose chief object is already secured.1 4
The "spontaneous declaration" exception for excited utterances, 5
then admits statements which, while hearsay, do not require cross-ex-
amination to test their reliability at trial.
The standards which determine whether a statement meets this test
of reliability and thus comes under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule were enunciated in People v. Poland and reiterated in
the instant case:
(1) An occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous
and unreflected statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and
11. McClesky v. Leadbetter, 1 Ga. 551, 555 (1846).
12. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, sec. 224 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, sec.
1362 (3rd, 1940).
13. 6 WIGMORE, supra at 1747; 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, sec. 708 (1967);
People v. Poland, 22 Il1. 2d 175, 174 N.E.2d 804 (1962).
14. 5 WIGMORE, supra at sec. 1420.
15. "Spontaneous" should be read, not as connoting a time relationship but rather
in its denotative sense of "coming freely and without premeditation or effort." 10
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY.
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(3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occur-
rence.16
The court in Stewart determined that too much time had elapsed be-
tween the occurrence and the statement to the aunt and the police offi-
cer and thus there was sufficient time to fabricate. The court con-
cluded that the statements, therefore, were not admissible under the
spontaneous declaration exceptions.
The court next considered whether the statements were admissible
as corroborative complaints, a second independent ground for admis-
sion peculiar to rape cases.
In rape cases, where the injured woman is a witness, it is proper for
the woman to testify that she made prompt complaint concerning
the outrage which had been perpetrated upon her, and it is proper
to permit the person to whom she complained to give testimony that
the complaint was made, but it is not proper to give any details of
the complaint. 17
The law allows such proof "upon the generous supposition that a
woman wronged will be prompted to express her indignation at the in-
jury inflicted upon her."' 8
Since such complaint would be a natural expression of outrage by one
so wronged,
It may therefore be shown in evidence as a circumstance which
would usually and probably have occurred in case the offense had
been committed. And further failure to complain . . . is looked
upon as a suspicious circumstance; and, to repel the inference that
the story may have been a mere fabrication, which otherwise might
be drawn, such evidence is admitted as tending to confirm or cor-
roborate the statements of the injured party. 19
Such admission should not be considered an exception to the hear-
say rule, as some courts have indicated, 20 for it admits only the fact that
complaint was made-the truth of which is known to the witness-
and not the details of the complaint-the truth of which is not known
to the witness. 21 When so restricted the testimony is not given for the
truth of the matter asserted but rather to prove that a complaint was in
fact made and rebut the inference which might otherwise occur. Thus
16. People v. Poland, 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181, 174 N.E.2d 804, 807 (1961).
17. People v. Romano, 306 Ill. 502, 503-504, 138 N.E. 169 (1923).
18. People v. DeFrates, 395 Ill. 439, 444, 70 N.E.2d 591 (1947).
19. 44 Am. Jur., Rape, sec. 83 (1942); see also, People v. Damen, 28 Il1. 2d 464,
193 N.E.2d 25 (1963).
20. People v. Furlong, 392 Ill. 247, 64 N.E.2d 460 (1946); People v. Davis, 10
111. 2d 430, 140 N.E.2d 675, cert. den. 355 U.S. 820, 78 S. Ct. 25, 2 L. Ed. 35.
21. People v. Damen, 28 Il. 2d 464, 474, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963).
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it is not hearsay, but rather "original evidence of a fact which is impor-
tant in rape cases and which cannot be ascertained in any other way."22
This testimony establishing the fact of complaint is admitted for a
very narrow purpose:
Admissibility is for the purpose of rebutting the presumption aris-
ing from the silence of the complainant, [and] it is unnecessary
to show the details of the declaration, but only the fact of its mak-
ing in order to negative the presumption arising from silence.23
To the extent that the presumption arising from silence is valid,24 it is
necessary to allow prosecutrix to rebut it. The question involved is not
what prosecutrix said, which would involve a hearsay problem, but
whether she said anything at all.
In those cases where the complaint was made under circumstances
which do not raise the risk of fabrication, the admission of the details
of the complaint under the spontaneous declaration exception to the
hearsay rule would eliminate any question as to the fact of complaint,
for inherent in the admission of the particulars is the fact of complaint.
While the particulars could not be admitted without admission of the
fact, it is impossible that the fact of complaint could be admitted without
the particulars. This is so because they are admitted under two sep-
arate doctrines, and while the statements themselves may not be ad-
missible as an exception to the hearsay rule, the fact of complaint may
be admitted to rebut the presumption raised by silence. So limited,
the testimony would not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
However, the admission of the fact of complaint when the details of the
complaint are excluded raises certain problems:
The reason for the rule admitting the fact that complaint was made
and excluding the complaint itself, is founded, aside from its being
hearsay, by those courts which do not treat it as part of the res
gestae, upon the danger of allowing a designing female to corrob-
orate her testimony by statements made by herself to third persons,
and the difficulty of disproving the principal fact by the accused. 25
While it is true that closeness in time is relevant to the admission of
the fact of complaint and that such evidence may be excluded if there
was an "inconsistent or unexplained delay" in the making of the com-
plaint,2" it is also true that the testimony as to the fact is admissible even
though "sufficient opportunity for reflection and invention"2 had in-
22. People v. Romano, 306 Ill. 502, 504, 138 N.E. 169 (1923).
23. People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 473, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963).
24. See note 6, supra.
25. 44 Am. Jur., Rape, sec. 84 (1942).
26. People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 473, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963).
27. Id. at 472.
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tervened. But whatever risk of fabrication attaches to the details of the
complaint also attaches to the complaint itself, and the "lapse of time
which disqualifies the statements as a spontaneous declaration also pro-
vides the complainant with an opportunity for reflection and inven-
tion."2 In other words, if the particulars of the complaint may have
been fabricated and are thus excluded, it follows that the complaint
itself may have been fabricated. The result is that, where the particulars
are not admissible as spontaneous declarations, the fact of complaint,
which carries the same risk of fabrication, is admitted.
So long as the evidence is admitted solely to rebut the presumption
raised by silence and the jury is clearly instructed in this regard, little
prejudice is likely to result. However, prejudice does become more
probable when too much is made of this evidence. As a general rule,
where defendant denies the charge of rape, the testimony of prosecutrix,
if not clear and convincing, must be corroborated by evidence of other
facts and circumstances to justify a conviction. 9 The need for corrob-
oration depends on the facts of the case, 3 but it is clear that where cor-
roboration is necessary, evidence of the complaint has been admitted for
this purpose." The result has been that the use of the fact of complaint
has been extended from negating the presumption raised by silence to
corroborating the testimony of the prosecutrix. Thus, where prosecu-
trix does not testify, proof of the fact of complaint is inadmissible, for
there is no testimony to corroborate.2
In other words, where the testimony is not convincing in the first
place, the law allows the prosecutrix to corroborate herself by evidence
of a complaint, the details of which were excluded as not being suffi-
ciently free from the risk of fabrication. "It is an arbitrary rule which
permits the corroboration of prosecutrix by her own complaint of the
assault upon her."'33  But this is precisely what this doctrine allows, and
it is especially important where her testimony is not sufficiently con-
vincing on its own. Thus, while excluding the particulars of the com-
plaint because of the "danger of allowing a designing female to cor-
roborate her testimony by statements made by herself to third per-
sons,"34 the courts reach the same result by allowing the fact of the possi-
bly fictitious complaint to corroborate prosectrix's testimony.
28. Id. at 474.
29. People v. Reaves, 24 Ill. 2d 380, 183 N.E.2d 176 (1967).
30. People v. Thompson, 91111. App. 2d 34, 234 N.E.2d 5 (1968).
31. People v. Scott, 407 Ill. 301, 95 N.E.2d 315 (1950); People v. Jenkins, 24 Ill.
2d 208, 181 N.E.2d 79 (1962).
32. People v. Furlong, 392 Ill. 247, 64 N.E.2d 469 (1946).
33. People v. Scattura, 238 Ill. 313, 316, 87 N.E. 332 (1909).
34. Supra, note 25.
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It is an immature jurisprudence that places reliance on corrobora-
tion, however unreliable the corroboration is, and rejects over-
whelming [sic] reliable proof because it lacks corroboration, how-
ever slight and however technical to the point of token satisfaction
of the rule. Quite often the corroboration supplied under the vari-
ous rules of criminal law, and particularly in sex cases, is weak in-
deed and supplies only a formalistic bridge over a very profound
discomfort in such cases because of the many motivational or
quasi-pathological reasons for distortion of the facts. 35
This is particularly true where the corroborative fact has already been
determined to be susceptible to the risk of fabrication and the story to
be corroborated contains deficiencies undermining its credibility.
This is not to say, however, that because of this danger, the fact of
complaint must be excluded. 36  But what must be recognized is that
the fact of complaint is admitted solely to rebut the presumption raised
by failure to complain. It does not go to the proof of the rape, nor does
it corroborate prosecutrix's testimony. If the testimony is not suffi-
ciently clear and convincing to sustain a conviction, evidence as to the
fact of complaint should not satisfy the requirement for corroboration
where the particulars are not admissible as spontaneous declaration.
On the other hand, where the testimony of prosecutrix is clear and con-
vincing, failure to make prompt complaint should not of itself be suffi-
cient to acquit.
It is difficult to determine how the Stewart court would have handled
this problem had it been faced with this question. The court did recog-
nize the classification of corroborative complaint, consisting of state-
ments of the rape victim made "at a time too remote to qualify as a spon-
taneous declaration," and "limited to the fact that complaint was
made." The court also stated that the complaints in question would
have been allowable "as corroborative complaints had the testimony
been limited to the fact of complaint. ''117  However, it gives no indica-
tion as to the purpose for such admission.
What the court did make clear was that the prime factor for consid-
eration in the admission of statements as spontaneous declarations is the
35. People v. Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 191, 234 N.E.2d 212, 214, 287 N.Y.S.2d
33, 36-37 (1967) (Breitel, J., concurring); see also 7 WIGMORE, supra note 8.
36. Indeed, it would seem to be beneficial to remove all time restrictions and allow
evidence as to the fact of complaint no matter how long after the occurrence the com-
plaint was made (see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, sec. 1135 (3rd, 1940)), with the length of
delay going only to the weight to be given the complaint. In fact, there would be cases
in which the delay would be so great that the fact of complaint would become positive
evidence for the defendant. The relevant questions would become: Given these cir-
cumstances, is it reasonable to believe that this complainant would have waited this
long to complain, had the rape occurred as alleged?
37. People v. Stewart, - Ill. App. 2d -, 264 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1970).
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presence or absence of time to fabricate and that, in this case, "prose-
cutrix did have time to fabricate.""8
Finding error in the admission of details of the complaint, the court
confronted the "presumption in Illinois law that if a trial court is the
trier of the facts, it is presumed that the judge considered only admis-
sible evidence, and that all incompetent evidence is disregarded in reach-
ing his decision. 39
The "premise seems to be that exclusion is only necessary to protect
the defendant from an irrational jury and is not needed when the fact-
finder is a judge who can coolly and professionally reach his decision
without considering the improper evidence."40  This presumption has
led one court to say that "in the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually im-
possible for a trial judge to commit reversible error by receiving incom-
petent evidence, whether objected to or not . . ." This would seem
to be a logical extension of the presumption, for if a judge considers
only the competent evidence, it really makes no difference what is ad-
mitted. This presumption would only be rebutted when the judge states
that he relied on evidence which is, in fact, incompetent.
Such a holding would, however, be contrary to Illinois decisions, and
the Appellate Court will not go this far. The court begins by repeat-
ing the presumption,4" but then recognizes a line of criminal cases quali-
fying the presumption, to the effect that even when there is no jury
the trial court may not convict on incompetent evidence. In People v.
Grodkiewicz, the Illinois Appellate Court said the presumption obtains
"unless it affirmatively appears that the court was misled or improperly
influenced by such remarks and [emphasis added] that they were pro-
ductive of a judgment and sentence contrary to the law and the evi-
dence. 43
But it is not only by express statement that the trial court can show
that it was misled: "Where an objection has been made to the evidence
and overruled, it cannot be presumed that the evidence did not enter
into the court's consideration. The ruling itself indicates that the court
thought the evidence proper."'44
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 79 Harv. L.R. 407 (1965).
41. Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950).
42. 264 N.E.2d at 559.
43. Id. at 560, citing People v. Grodkiewicz, 16 Ill. 2d 192, 200, 157 N.E.2d 16
(1959).
44. People v. DeGroot, 108 II1. App. 2d 1, 11, 247 N.E.2d 177 (1968); see also,
People v, Smith, 55 I11. App. 2d 480, 204 N.E.2d 577, (1965) where the court seems to
find a similar showing of reliance in the trial court's refusal to strike incompetent
testimony.
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Thus, finding reliance in the trial court's overruling of the objection
to the admission of the incompetent evidence, the Stewart court failed
to examine its effect, leaving the rationale behind its decision unclear.
In citing People v. Grodkiewicz,45 the court seems to be saying that
the presumption controls unless the appellate court finds both reliance
on the incompetent evidence by the trial judge and a verdict contrary to
the weight of the evidence. However, the court will overturn any con-
viction which is contrary to the weight of the competent evidence,
whether or not incompetent evidence was admitted. Thus, the reli-
ance of the trial court on incompetent evidence would be immaterial, for
as long as the verdict was against the weight of the competent evidence,
the court would reverse whether or not there was reliance. This being
so, the presumption against reliance would have no effect, for reliance
would never be a question.
However, after citing Grodkiewicz, which said that for reversal a
judgment must be contrary to the evidence, the Stewart court did not
discuss the question of the sufficiency of the evidence and apparently
overturned on the basis of the trial court's reliance on the incompetent
evidence:
From a review of the record, we are of the opinion that, in this in-
stance, the trial judge did believe the testimony of the aunt and po-
lice officer to be admissible evidence under the spontaneous dec-
laration rule and, further, that he did rely upon such evidence in ar-
riving at his decision. 46
But if this were the sole test for the reversal of a criminal verdict in a
bench trial, it is a harsher rule than that for a jury verdict. Even if in-
competent evidence is admitted in a jury trial, the verdict will not be
overturned if the error was not prejudicial. It is thus apparent that the
Stewart court did not make reliance the sole test for reversal.
If the second requirement is that the verdict is contrary to the com-
petent evidence then the court's finding that the trial court relied on in-
competent evidence would have been unnecessary, a presumption
against reliance would be meaningless, and a discussion of the reasons
for finding the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence would
have been essential. On the other hand, the court may have consid-
ered the second requirement to be that the error was harmful, which
could be assumed without discussion under the facts once reliance was
found. An examination of the cases cited by the Stewart court in sup-
45. See n. 43, supra.
46. - I11. App. 2d -, 264 N.E.2d at 560.
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port of its formulation of the presumption sheds some light on the con-
fusion.
People v. Grodkiewicz involved an appeal of a conviction for receiv-
ing stolen property on the grounds, inter alia, that remarks by the State's
Attorney during trial and in the closing argument misstated the law
and the evidence and were prejudicial. 47  The court found that the
judgment was fully supported by the evidence,4" and, after stating the
presumption that the trial judge in the absence. of the jury will "disre-
gard all evidence heard except that which is competent and relevant"49
held that the court will not reverse absent a showing of reliance and a
verdict contrary to the evidence and affirmed the conviction, holding:
If we assume the impropriety of the remarks of counsel, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the trial judge was misled
thereby or that he lacked the legal discernment to render a judg-
ment and sentence strictly in accord with the law and the evi-
dence.5 0
Of the four cases cited by the Stewart court as following the reasoning
of Grodkiewicz, only one affirmed the trial court, and it did not rely
solely on the presumption. The court in People v. Jackson, in affirm-
ing the conviction for aggravated battery, found that, although the ad-
mission of the incompetent testimony was objected to, "the trial court
made no ruling on the objection and defense counsel did not press for a
ruling thereon." In addition, the incompetent testimony was excluded
from "the trial court's extensive summary of the evidence" and the evi-
dence was, therefore, not prejudicial to the defendant.51 In effect, the
court found an affirmative showing of no reliance on the incompetent
evidence by the trial court.
In the other three cases cited by the Stewart court, the courts acknowl-
edged the existence of the presumption, but reversed and remanded on
the basis of a finding of reliance. The court in People v. Moore, after
finding that "the evidence was adequate to sustain a finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, ' 52 reversed the conviction for attempted
robbery, attempted murder, and aggravated battery. The court found
that the admission of hearsay testimony to corroborate the one witness
who had testified to the robbery was "clearly prejudicial"5 and that the
trial court's statement "that he would not 'deprive counsel of an oppor-
47. People v. Grodkiewicz, 16 Il1. 2d 192, 199, 157 N.E.2d 16 (1959).
48. Id. at 198, 200.
49. Id. at 199; see People v. Grabowski, 12 Ill. 2d 462, 467, 147 N.E.2d 49 (1957).
50. People v. Grodkiewicz, 16 Ill. 2d 192, 200, 157 N.E.2d 16 (1959).51. People v. Jackson, 95111. App. 2d 193, 199, 238 N.E.2d 196 (1968).
52. People v. Moore, 95 Ill. App. 2d 89, 94, 238 N.E.2d 67 (1968).
53. Id.
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tunity to give the court some insight as to [the declarant]' ,'4 was
sufficient to show reliance on such testimony.
In People v. Smith, the court reversed and remanded a conviction for
taking indecent liberties with a child after finding that fabrication on
the part of the complaining witness was "highly improbable in the light
of his clear and detailed description of the incident and its attendant
circumstances, ' 55 and that "the facts admitted by the defendant cer-
tainly give rise to the inference that his interest in these children was
other than platonic""6 and that the testimony was corroborated. The
basis for the court's finding of reliance is unclear, but it apparently
found that the trial court's refusal to strike the incompetent hearsay of
a second complainantr 7 indicated that the trial court gave some weight
to it and "since we are unable to determine how much weight was given
to this improper evidence, the conviction must be reversed and re-
manded.""8
Finally, in People v. DeGroot, the. court found that the competent
evidence was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
nevertheless held that the trial court's overruling of defendant's objec-
tion to the admission of evidence of prior convictions in a trial for
drunken driving was sufficient to show reliance59 and that such evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant,"° and therefore reversed the judgment.
Thus, in the three cases which reversed the trial court, the courts did
not require the decision to be against the weight of the evidence and in
fact found that the decision was supported by the evidence. In Grod-
kiewicz and Jackson, the courts found neither reliance nor insuffi-
ciency of evidence, thus did not have to consider whether both would
be necessary in order to reverse. It therefore seems more probable that
when reliance on incompetent evidence is demonstrated the question is
not whether the judgment was contrary to the weight of the evidence,
but rather whether the evidence admitted was prejudicial to the defend-
ant. The concern, then, is the same whether the trial is held before a
jury or not, for even a jury verdict will not be overturned if the error was
harmless.
Under this interpretation there is still some question as to the validity
of the presumption. If an objection to incompetent evidence is made
54. Id. at 95.
55. People v. Smith, 55 Ill. App. 2d 480, 486, 204 N.E.2d 579 (1965).
56. Id. at 487.
57. Id. at 485.
58. Id. at 488.
59. People v. DeGroot, 108 I1. App. 2d 1, 11, 247 N.E.2d 177 (1968).
60. Id. at 10.
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and sustained, then no presumption is necessary because it is manifest
that the judge did not consider the evidence. If the objection is over-
ruled then DeGroot and Stewart would suggest that the presumption
is rebutted and therefore has no effect. If no objection is made and the
evidence is admitted then the effect is the same in a bench trial as in a
jury trial because the objection would be waived and a decision could
be based upon the otherwise inadmissible evidence. 1 If the judge
withholds ruling on the objection and the objecting party does not re-
new the objection and request a ruling at the close of the evidence then
the presumption would have effect. However, this would only occur
due to the failure to renew and would be similar to a waiver. Thus, the
presumption would be very limited in scope.
Yet, it is apparent that the appellate court does consider the non-
jury trial differently and is less likely to reverse a bench trial because of
the admission of incompetent evidence. Thus, if the presumption is to
have effect, it must be in the determination of harmless and prejudicial
error.
The presumption that in a non-jury trial the judge will consider only
the admissible evidence was first enunciated in a criminal trial in Peo-
ple v. Reed.62 However, after stating the presumption, the court in
Reed found it rebutted by the trial court's overruling of defendant's ob-
jection and while acknowledging "that the same harmful effect does
not follow where a case is tried by a court without a jury,''63 reversed be-
cause it could not say that the error did not affect the outcome.64
Among those courts which accept the presumption, its application has
never been very well settled. While the majority may begin by recog-
nizing the presumption, those which have refused to reverse the convic-
tion challenged for the admission of incompetent evidence seem to have
done so for reasons quite apart for the presumption.
For example, several courts have been moved to cite People v. Cox
to uphold the proposition that there is a presumption, but fail to note the
court's reason for sustaining:
Furthermore, the trial judge in commenting on the evidence when
61. Under Supreme Court Rule 615 (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1IOA, sec. 615 (1968))
consideration of errors not objected to is discretionary with the Appellate Court.
"Briefly it may be said that the pivitol factors to be considered to determine whether or
not an exercise of such discretion is warranted are: the closeness of the case, the con-
duct of the trial judge, the extent to which questionable evidence may have contributed
to a guilty verdict, the fairness of the trial in general, and the magnitude of the error
alleged." People v. Lagardo, 82 I1. App. 2d 119, 124, 226 N.E.2d 492 (1967).
62. People v. Reed, 287 Ill. 606, 122 N.E. 806 (1919).
63. Id. at 611.
64. Id. at 612.
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he entered his judgment clearly indicated that he gave little or no
weight [emphasis added] to the co-defendant's statements, but re-
lied on the positive identification of the complaining witness. 65
Other courts have cited the presumption while holding that the evi-
dence was, in fact, admissible,66 or that its effect was merely cumula-
tive.17 In a remarkable example of the effect of this presumption, the
court in People v. Alexander 8 noted the presumption while making it
clear that the evidence admitted was competent, the incompetent evi-
dence was ordered striken by the judge, and the trial judge clearly indi-
cated that he based his decision on the competent evidence which he had
admitted and not on the incompetent evidence which he had excluded.
As pointed out in People v. Smith, despite the fact that the majority
of Illinois Supreme Court decisions on the question of admissibility of
evidence in a criminal bench trial since People v. Reed have recognized
the presumption:
Three cases exist, however, which have in no way been commented
upon in any case in the Reed line and which hold directly contrary
to the Reed line, namely, the trial judge in a bench trial of a crimi-
nal case is not accorded the same presumption which is accorded
the chancellor in a chancery case that he will consider only compe-
tent evidence. 69
After a survey of the cases in which the presumption was raised, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Nuccio, said:
While we could continue to distinguish the many other cases which
contain statements of the presumption that judges consider only
proper evidence, no useful purpose would be served by doing so.
The rule as generally applied is a good one. But there are, it
seems to us, limits to the immunity . . . which judges are presumed
to possess. 70
It is only where the facts are close and it cannot fairly be said that guilt
or innocence was otherwise manifestly shown, that there appears to be a
difference between a jury verdict and a bench verdict. The various
65. People v. Cox, 22 Ill. 2d 534, 539, 177 N.E.2d 211, cert. den. in 374 U.S. 855
(1961); see also, People v. Alexander, 21 Ill. 2d 347, 172 N.E.2d 785, cert. den. in
368 U.S. 875 (1961); People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill. 2d 350, 181 N.E.2d 143 (1962);
People v. French, 33 Ill. 2d 146, 210 N.E.2d 540, cert. den. in 384 U.S. 1016 (1965).
66. People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 753 (1931); People v. Grabowski,
12 Ill. 2d 462, 147 N.E.2d 49 (1958); People v. Lacey, 24 Ill. 2d 607, 182 N.E.2d 730
(1962); People v. Lewis, 30 111. 2d 617, 198 N.E.2d 812 (1964).
67. People v. Saisi, 24 Ill. 2d 274, 181 N.E.2d 68 (1962); People v. Palmer, 26
Ill. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236, cert. den. in 373 U.S. 951 (1963).
68. People v. Armstrong, 80 111. App. 2d 77, 224 N.E.2d 675 (1967).
69. People v. Smith, 55 Ill. App. 2d 480, 488, 204 N.E.2d 577 (1965); See, People
v. Reichart, 352 Ill. 358, 185 N.E. 585 (1933); People v. Arendarczyk, 367 Ill. 534,
12 N.E.2d 2 (1937); People v. Borrelli, 392 I11. 481, 64 N.E.2d 719 (1946).
70. People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d 375, 395-96, 253 N.E.2d 353 (1969).
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courts seem to suggest that they will more readily reverse a jury verdict,
where it cannot be determined how much weight the jury gave the in-
competent evidence.
What the presumption would mean, then, is that where there has
been incompetent evidence introduced, the jury, not knowing the law,
is likely to use it in reaching its verdict; whereas, the judge, knowing
the law, is likely to disregard it. Since the jury is likely to -use it, the de-
fendant must be protected by an examination of the record to deter-
mine, not whether the evidence was in fact prejudicial, but only whether
it might have been prejudicial; but since the judge is likely to consider
only competent evidence in reaching his verdict, if the evidence amply
supports his verdict, the court is less likely to overturn it, unless he indi-
cates that he did rely on the incompetent evidence or there is a strong
reason to believe it influenced his decision.
The court will carefully examine the record, especially in a rape
case,71 to determine whether to give credence to the verdict in light of
all the attendant circumstances, and the presumption becomes no more
than a circumstance to be considered 2-along with the substance of
the evidence, its relation to competent evidence, and other facts and
circumstances peculiar to the individual case. This presumption, then,
appears to be an artificial proposition, constructed to give support to the
obvious-that the judge is likely to know the applicable law, and the
jury is not.
Thus, by continuing the tradition of recognizing the presumption for
cases other than the one under consideration, the court continues the
theory without the application. A much more direct method of address-
ing this problem would be to recognize that, somewhere along the line,
the courts have lost sight of the origins of this doctrine. In People v.
Reed, where the presumption seems to have been first enunciated co-
herently, the court held:
It is urged that inasmuch as the trial was before the court without a
jury, the error, although serious and prejudicial, is not sufficient
ground for reversing the judgment. The court, in the constant ef-
fort to sustain judgments which appear to be right on the merits
[emphasis added] has frequently held in civil cases that if upon a
review of the record the competent evidence sustans the judg-
ment, it will not be reversed, and has said that the same harmful
effect does not follow where a case is tried by a court without a jury
as where trial is before a jury, [citations omitted]. That rule is
correct where upon review of the record the court can say the judg-
434
71. People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill. 2d 457, 185 N.E.2d 211 (1962).
72. People v. Taylor, 410 Il. 469, 102 N.E.2d 529 (1951).
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ment is right regardless of the admission of incompetent evidence
and erroneous rulings, [emphasis added] but there is no course of
sound reasoning justifying a conclusion that a court considering evi-
dence competent and relevant as tending to prove the issue when
ruling on the admission of testimony regards it as incompetent and
not tending to prove the issue when finding the fact. The court
ruled that the evidence of the former conviction for stealing an
automobile was relevant to prove defendant guilty of the crime of
pandering, with which he was charged, and the evidence was not
afterward stricken out, nor is there anything in the record indicat-
ing it was disregarded. The evidence was directly and flatly con-
tradictory, and the court cannot say that the finding must neces-
sarily have been that the defendant was guilty of the offense with
which he was charged, regardless of the incompetent evidence.
[emphasis added] 73
Instead of continuing this presumption in its present special form, it
would be better to eliminate it, leaving only the general rule that, un-
less affirmative cause is shown, the verdict will not be disturbed. One
such affirmative cause is insufficiency of the competent evidence; this is
no different whether the trial is a bench trial or a jury trial. Another
such affirmative cause is admission of incompetent evidence such as to
prejudice the rights of the defendant. While the presumption that
the trier of fact knows the law is an important circumstance to be con-
sidered, so too is the nature of the case, whether the evidence is merely
cumulative, etc. Such a ruling would bring theory into line with what
seems to be the practice, as stated in People v. Vaughn:
The record here is not entirely free from error, but it is not the
court's duty to review the record in a criminal case to determine
whether or not it is free from error, and it is not the policy of the
court to reverse a judgment of conviction merely because error has
been committed, unless it appears that real justice has been de-
nied or that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court
may have resulted from such error.7 4
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73. People v. Reed, 287 Ill. 606, 611-12, 122 N.E. 806 (1919).
74. People v. Vaughn, 390 Ill. 360, 374, 61 N.E.2d 546 (1945).
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